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IN PAR! DELICTO AS A BAR TO TIPPEE'S RECOVERY UNDER
RULE 10b-5: THE CONCEPT OF "PUBLIC INTEREST"
IN TRADE REGULATION COMPARED
I. Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp.'
In Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp. plaintiff Kuehnert sought recovery
against defendants Rhame and Texstar Corporation of damages al-
legedly suffered as a result of defendants' violation of Rule 10b-5 of
the SEC.' In January of 1965 Rhame, President of Texstar, gave
Kuehnert, a business acquaintance, supposedly confidential corporate
information. Rhame told Kuehnert that the Texaco and Humble Oil
Companies had agreed with Texstar to drill two wells on Texstar land;
as a result, Texstar's earnings for the fiscal year ending March 31,
1965 would be $3.30 per share and the value of the stock would in-
crease greatly. Kuehnert relied upon this "inside" information and
began purchasing Texstar stock. The drilling farmouts never material-
ized and Texstar did not earn the predicted $3.30. Nevertheless Kueh-
nert continued to buy stock in Texstar, accepting Rhame's excuses as
to why earnings were not as predicted, and believing, first, that
Rhame's drilling and earnings forecasts would eventually come true,
and second, that this was information which the other stockholders
and the public did not have. By May of 1965 Kuehnert had purchased
94,600 shares of Texstar stock, most of which he bought on margin,
pledging his shares at a number of banks and businesses. In June of
1965 Rhame resigned as president of Texstar. Shortly thereafter a
1 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969).
2 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1969). Rule 10b-5 was promulgated from Section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which prohibits and seeks to prevent fraud. 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964); A. Bromberg, Securities Law: Fraud—SEC Rule 10b-5 § 2.1
(1968). "The rule may be invoked whenever any person, insider or outsider, indulges in
fraudulent practices, misstatements or half-truths in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities." 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1445 (1961). Strictly speaking, the
rule only prohibits conduct and makes no provision for compensating parties injured by
violations. However, the courts have consistently inferred civil liability under the rule,
basing their holdings upon several different theories. See A. Bromberg, supra, § 2.4. See
also Slavin v. Germantown Fire Ins. Co., 174 F.2d 799, 805 (3d Cir. 1949) ; Northern
Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954, 964 (N.D. Ill. 1952); Osborne
v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73
F. Supp. 798, 800 (ED. Pa. 1947).
The full text of the rule is:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facility of a national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1969).
257
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
brokerage firm returned a check for a Texstar stock purchase to
Kuehnert for insufficient funds, while at the same time selling him out.
Having overextended himself, Kuehnert was unable to continue pur-
chasing Texstar stock, the price of the stock declined, and finally Kueh-
nert was completely sold out at a loss. Kuehnert later discovered that
Rhame had deliberately misled him in an attempt to gain working
control of the corporation for his own benefit. Defendant Rhame
contended that, in view of Kuehnert's own attempted violation of
rule lob-5 in purchasing stock on the basis of what he believed was
"inside" information that those who sold to him did not have, he
should be precluded from invoking the rule to recover damages from
the defendant. The District Court for the Southern District of Texas
held that rule lOb-5 protects the ordinary person who buys and sells
securities based upon information generally available to the investing
public, and that no such protection is afforded to one who has access
to or believes he has access to secret corporate information. 3 Thus
the district court ruled that plaintiff had no cause of action because
he was not within the class of persons to be protected under rule
lob-S. It followed alternatively, the district court reasoned, that as a
bar to recovery, the defendants could validly raise the defense of in
pari delicto against Kuehnert. 4
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that Kueh-
nert, if not strictly in pari delicto, at least had unclean hands because
of his intention to defraud his vendors by concealing what he believed
to be inside information. The court decided that the objective of the
securities laws, that is, the protection of the investing public, would
be best promoted in the circumstances of the present case by the
allowance of the defenses.' In so doing the court opted for the deter-
rent effect on tippees rather than that on insiders. The court based
its decision on what it called the "guiding principle" that the degree of
public interest in private SEC violations is not comparable to that in
antitrust violations so as to warrant a limitation of the unclean hands
and in pari delicto defenses as a matter of policy.' Thus, their appli-
cation in a particular case rests with the discretion of the court.?
This case raises for the first time the question of allowing in pari
delicto and unclean hands as defenses in private rule lOb-S actions.
The court here has taken a very narrow view of the public interest in
private SEC suits. Its assertion that there is insufficient public interest
to justify limitation of common law defenses is questionable. The
purposes of the securities laws are broader than merely the protection
of investors. Like private antitrust actions, private rule lob-5 actions
aid in the enforcement of the law. In the antitrust area unclean hands
has been eliminated and in pari delicto severely restricted in order to
3 Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 286 F. Supp. 340, 345 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
4 Id.
5 412 F.2d at 704-05.
f5 Id. at 702.
/ Id. at 704.
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encourage private suits.' In support of its holding the Kuehnert
court relied on the availability of the defenses in SEC proxy require-
ments cases. But those cases are not as clearcut as the court suggests.
This comment will examine court treatment of the defenses in proxy
cases and other SEC private actions, and will compare the public
interest in SEC violations with that in antitrust violations to determine
whether Kuehnert is consistent with promotion of the policy of the
securities laws and rule I0b-5 in particular.
II. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF COMMON LAW DEFENSES IN PRIVATE
SEC SUITS: PROXY REGULATION, EXPRESS CIVIL LIABILITY AND
MARGIN REQUIREMENTS CASES
In Gaudiosi v. Mellon,' cited in Kuehnert in support of allowance
of the defenses, equitable relief sought by plaintiff stockholder in the
course of a proxy contest was barred by the defense of unclean hands.
The district court held that where a candidate for director of the
Pennsylvania Railroad Company in opposition to management candi-
dates sent banks, which were the registered owners of stock in the
company, telegrams in violation of SEC proxy rules, and which were
intended by the candidate to induce the banks to withhold proxies and
thereby deprive management candidates of votes, the plaintiff candi-
date had unclean hands barring equitable relief relating to the proxy
contest.1° This was an alternative holding. It is noteworthy that in its
Conclusions of Law, the district court first found that defendant's
conduct of the proxy contest was neither unlawful nor inequitable."
On appeal the lower court decision was upheld on the basis of plain-
tiff's unclean hands and the general equity principle that
[p]ublic policy not only makes it obligatory for courts to
deny a plaintiff relief once his "unclean hands" are estab-
lished but to refuse to even hear a case under such circum-
stances."
On the face of its opinion the court of appeals ruled out any possibility
of relief for a plaintiff with unclean hands, although it may have been
influenced by the district court's alternative findings concerning the
defendant's conduct. More important, the court gave no consideration
to whether promotion of the policy of the securities acts might dictate
a different result.
Also cited in support of allowance of the defenses by the court
8 See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc., v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
See also Comment, Private Antitrust Suits: The In Pari Delief° Defense, 10 B.C. Ind.
& Corn. L. Rev. 172 (1968); Comment, Limiting the Unclean Hands and In Pari Delicto
Defenses in Anti-Trust Suits: An Additional Justification, 54 Nw. U.L. Rev. 456 (1959).
9 166 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1958), aff'd, 269 F.2d 873 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 902 (1959).
lo 166 F. Supp. at 370-71.
11 Id. at 369-70.
12 269 F.2d at 882.
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in Kuehnert is Studebaker Corp. v. Allied Prods. Corp." In Studebaker
the court first found no basis upon which to grant plaintiff a prelim-
inary injunction with respect to the conduct of a corporate proxy
contest. But finding that the proxy materials involved in the case were
in fact misleading, though not intentionally false, the court ordered
new record and meeting dates and court supervision of the contents
of the new proxy materials. At this point the plaintiff objected to this
form of relief, and claimed that the court had no power to fashion
such relief. In reply the court then observed that there was a strong
inference that plaintiff was in violation of the equitable doctrine of
unclean hands with respect to certain efforts by the plaintiff to avoid
discovery in the course of the proceedings. The substance of the
court's remarks was not aimed at allowing unclean hands as a bar to
plaintiff's recovery against defendant, but instead was only to demon-
strate that the plaintiff's objections to the court's exercise of its equit-
able powers were "not well taken." 14
In Union Pacific R. R. v. Chicago Nw. Ry„15 cited by the Kueh-
nert court as offering analogous support, the court refused to dismiss a
suit for injunctive relief where defendants asserted the defense of un-
clean hands against the plaintiffs. The suit was brought to enjoin a
proxy election on grounds of violation of SEC proxy rules, and the
facts indicated that both sides in the contest may have violated proxy
regulations. The court said that to dismiss the action on the basis of an
unclean hands defense would work a hardship upon the rights of the
public:
To apply the maxim in this case would produce the il-
logic of leaving the shareholders unprotected when they have
been doubly misled, stultifying the underlying purpose of the
national securities laws. Where a public interest is at stake,
above the interests of the parties themselves, the protection
of that paramount interest overcomes the judicial reluctance
to assist the wrongdoer.' 6
When defendant Northwestern asked the court for more time to
pursue discovery for more evidence of unclean hands, the court refused
the request and found unclean hands to be insufficient as a defense "in
these circumstances even if factually established." 17
 It should be noted
that the court here based its decision on direct injury to the share-
holders. In Kuehnert the court assumed there was no harm to anyone
but the participants, and would undoubtedly have barred the defenses
in the exercise of its discretion under circumstances similar to Union
Pacific.
Union Pacific cited Shinsaku Nagano v. McGrath" and A.C.
13 256 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
14 Id. at 192.
15 226 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
16 Id. at 410.
17 Id. at 414.
18 187 F.2d 753 (7th Cir. 1951).
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Frost & Co. v. Coeur d' Alene Mines Corp." in support of its position.
The lower court in Shinsaku Nagano denied equitable relief to a Japa-
nese alien resident who sought to recover shares of stock which had
been seized by the Alien Property Custodian during World War 11.20
The court pointed out that plaintiff was willing to take income tax
advantage of the situation which was the basis of his action. This and
other similar conduct by the plaintiff led the court to conclude that the
plaintiff should be denied equitable relief and "should be left in the
position where his own actions have placed him!" 21 The court of ap-
peals reversed, stating:
The [unclean hands] doctrine, which applies only to
willful as distinguished from negligent misconduct, is not,
however, applicable to every inconsistent act of a party but
to conduct which is "unconscionable" or "morally repre-
hensible." An expression of public policy, the clean hands
maxim is not an inexorable rule, but will be relaxed where
public policy would be better served by so doing . . . 2)22
In A.C. Frost the Supreme Court reversed a lower court decision
which had held that plaintiff could not recover damages for breach of
an option contract because the contract was "void because prohibited
by law."23 The Supreme Court assumed that the agreement involved
a public offering in which securities were distributed in violation of
the 1933 Act. Under such circumstances the Court observed that to
deny relief because of the illegality of the contract "would probably
seriously hinder rather than aid the real purpose of the statute!'" The
Court stated:
Courts have often added a sanction to those prescribed
for an offense created by statute where the circumstances
fairly indicated that this would further the essential purpose
of the enactment; but we think where the contrary definitely
appears—actual hindrance indeed of the purpose—no such
addition is permissible. The latter situation is beyond the
reason which supports the doctrine now relied on. 2
Notably, the Court included in the opinion an excerpt from the Mem-
orandum of the SEC filed by permission of the Court in A.C. Frost:
It appears to us to be entirely immaterial whether in
such a case the agreement is labelled 'void' or .the parties are
held to be 'in pari delicto.' There, labels, as often is the case,
merely state the conclusion reached, but do not aid in solu-
12 312 U.S. 38 (1941).
20 Shinsaku Nagano v. Clark, 85 F. Supp. 368 (ND. III. 1949).
21
 Id. at 373.
22 187 F.2d at 759.
23 61 Idaho 21, 27, 98 P.2d 965,968 (1939).
24 312 U.S. at 43.
26 Id.
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tion of the problem. The ultimate issue is whether the result
in the particular case would effectuate or frustrate the pur-
poses of the Act."
The Kuehnert court distinguished away the case of Can-Am Pe-
troleum Co. v. Beck," where contribution defenses were rejected by
the court, by saying that Can-Am was a case of mere knowledge by the
plaintiff of defendant's wrongdoing without active • participation. In
Can-Am, the plaintiff initiated an action under Section 12 of the
1933 Act's against defendant corporation which had made misrepre-
sentations and thereby sold to plaintiff unregistered securities in vi-
olation of the 1933 Act.
Like rule 10b-5, Section 12, the express civil liability provision
of the 1933 Act, seeks to prevent deception in securities dealings. To
accomplish this object, it provides for private recovery for misrepre-
sentation in the sale of securities by use of the mails or other means
of interstate transportation or communication." Defendant responded
that plaintiff should be barred from recovery because she was in pari
delicto, having participated in promoting and selling defendant's shares
to others, thereby violating the same statute she sought to invoke.
The court of appeals described plaintiff's activities as "both legally
reckless and naive," but concluded that she had at no time had the
degree of culpability attributed to the defendants."
In affirming the district court's award of damages to the plain-
tiff, the court of appeals stressed the importance of looking at the
total circumstances of the parties' association "when the public interest
is involved in the enforcement of a statutory remedy."" The court
found the principle stated in Miller v. California Roofing Co.' ap-
plicable to the federal securities acts:
since the policy of the law designed to discourage illegal
agreements comes in conflict with that policy which demands
the effective enforcement of the Corporate Securities Act,
the law differentiates the guilt of the parties, because refusal
of relief to the less culpable would involve harmful effects
wholly out of proportion to the requirements of individual
punishment or the discouragement of illegal contracts."
In Can-Am, therefore, the court recognized a sufficient degree of public
interest in the enforcement of a statutory remedy under the securities
acts to allow recovery by a participant in the violation. Under such
circumstances the court felt it necessary to differentiate the guilt of
the parties.
28 Id. at 44, n. 2.
27 331 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1964).
28 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1964).
28 Id.
30 331 F.2d at 373.
31 Id .
3 2 55 Cal. App.2d 136, 143-44, 130 P.2d 740, 745 (App. Div. 1942).
33 .331 F.2d at 373.
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In cases where federal margin requirements have been violated by
a broker the question of allowance of common law contribution de-
fenses frequently arises because the investor who charges the broker
with the violation has in many cases himself agreed or assented to the
unlawful credit terms at the time of the transaction. To prevent the
excessive use of credit for purchase or carrying of securities, Section 7
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934" (hereinafter the 1934 Act)
authorized the board of governors of the Federal Reserve System to
regulate the amount of credit that may be extended on any security
registered on a national securities exchange as well as on selected over-
the-counter securities. The margin provisions of the 1934 Act were
adopted in response to the role that the over-extension of security
credit had played in causing the depression." The legislative history
of the margin requirements provisions demonstrates congressional
awareness of a public purpose overriding concern for the individual
investor:
Nor is the main purpose even protection of the small spec-
ulator by making it impossible for him to spread himself too
thinly—although such a result will be achieved as a byprod-
uct of the main purpose.
The main purpose is to give a Government credit agency an
effective method of reducing the aggregate amount of the
Nation's credit resources which can be directed by specula-
tion into the stock market and out of other more desirable
uses of commerce and industry—to prevent a recurrence of
the pre-crash situation where funds which would otherwise
have been available at normal interest rates for uses of local
commerce, industry, and agriculture, were drained by far
higher rates into security loans and the New York call
market."
Section 7(c) 37 of the 1934 Act prohibits any broker or dealer
who transacts business in securities from extending or maintaining
credit on regulated securities to or for any customer in contravention
of the rules and regulations of the board of governors of the Federal
Reserve System. This is the provision of the Act under which cus-
tomers may bring actions against brokers. If the customer was not in
some way a participant in the violation, liability of the defendant
broker is clear. But when the customer and broker agree in some man-
ner to transact business in contravention of the federal margin re-
quirements, usually on the broker's recommendation, the court must
34 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1964), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (Supp. IV, 1969).
35
 The extensive liquidation of security loans has been recognized as a major
cause of the depression. Note, Federal Margin Requirements as a Basis for Civil
Liability, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 1462, 1464 (1966). It is the public policy of the United
States to discourage and prevent the purchase of stock on extended credit. Klein v D R
Comenzo Co., 207 N.Y.S. 2d 739 (Mun. Ct. 1960).
36 H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong,, 2d Sess. 8 (1934).
37 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c) (1964).
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decide whether recovery should be granted to the customer who is
himself a wrongdoer.
In Moscarelli v. Stamm" the court denied plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment in a margin requirement case where the broker and
customer had entered agreements with each other which violated fed-
eral reserve margin rules. The courts stated that the broker was not
absolutely liable under these circumstances, and that the broker's
implied civil liability was subject to "the traditional tort concepts of
causation and contributory negligence or analogous conduct." 3° Con-
cluding that plaintiff's participation in the statutory violations of the
margin rules presented a triable issue which could not be determined
by summary judgment, the court noted that earlier decisions had held
only that upon a motion for dismissal the "mere participation by the
customer does not per se bar his recovery," 40 and that those decisions
did not adjudicate the effect of willful and active participation in such
violations. The court indicated that such participation would preclude
recovery."
It is apparent that the cases relied upon by the Kuehnert court in
support of its proposition that there is not a sufficient degree of public
interest in private SEC violations to warrant limitation of contribution
defenses as a matter of policy did not actually consider that question.
Some cases under the securities acts have considered, like Kuehnert,
whether under the facts of a particular case allowance of the defenses
would promote or frustrate the policy of the Acts. In Shinsaku Nagano
and Moscarelli, the courts recognized that the willfulness of plaintiff's
conduct was to be considered where public policy would be best served
thereby. The Kuehnert court suggested that mere violation of rule
1 Ob-5 by plaintiff was sufficient to bar recovery. Can-Am stressed the
importance of differentiating the guilt of the parties where enforcement
of a statutory remedy under the federal securities acts was involved, be-
cause of the degree of public interest. The enforcement of the securities
acts generally, and rule 1 Ob-5 in particular, has much greater impor-
tance than the protection of individual investors. Even in Kuehnert
the court recognized that its assumption that there was no harm to
anyone but the participants is questionable.42 It is suggested here that
exposure of rule 10b-5 violations for purposes of enforcement carries
such a public interest as to justify limitations on unclean hands and
in pari delicto similar to those in private antitrust suits.
III. THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN PRIVATE SUITS UNDER THE
SECURITIES ACTS
It was recognized by the court in Kuehnert that, while illegal
conduct on the part of a plaintiff should generally bar recovery, in
38 288 F. Supp. 453 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
39 Id. at 459-60.
40 Id. at 459.
41 Id. at 460.
42
 412 F.2d at 703, n. 5.
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certain areas exceptions to this rule should be made. Such an exception
has been made in the antitrust field. Severe restrictions have been
placed as a matter of policy on the application of the unclean hands
and in pari delicto defenses in private antitrust suits. The reason for
this has been stated by the Supreme Court in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc.
v. International Parts Corp."
We have often indicated the inappropriateness of invoking
broad common-law barriers to relief where a private suit
serves important public purposes. . . . [T] he purposes of the
antitrust laws are best served by insuring that the private
action will be an ever-present threat to deter anyone contem-
plating business behavior in violation of the antitrust laws.
The plaintiff who reaps the reward of treble damages may be
no less morally reprehensible than the defendant, but the law
encourages his suit to further the overriding public policy in
favor of competition. A more fastidious regard for the relative
moral worth of the parties would only result in seriously
undermining the usefulness of the private action as a bulwark
of antitrust enforcement. And permitting the plaintiff to re-
cover a windfall gain does not encourage continued violations
by those in his position since they remain fully subject to
civil and criminal penalties for their own illegal conduct."
Private suits aid in the enforcement of the antitrust laws by ex-
posing violations and by serving as an "ever present threat to deter
anyone contemplating business behavior in violation of the antitrust
laws."'" This dual role was given added impetus by the statutory
provision for recovery of treble damages by private plaintiffs. 4° The
Supreme Court has termed private suits "a bulwark of antitrust en-
forcement."T The restriction of the unclean hands and in poi delicto
defenses encourages private suits. A disenchanted co-conspirator is
usually the most informed, interested and available party to expose
an antitrust violation. The knowledge that allies may be potential
opponents attracted by the promise of treble damages has a strong
deterrent effect upon potential violators. Thus, the courts will allow
even an undeserving party to benefit" when such a party brings an
action under the antitrust laws in order to promote the broad public
43 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
44 rd. at 138-39.
45 Id. at 139.
48 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964). The Clayton Act also encourages private antitrust suits
by permitting the use of a final judgment or decree in an antitrust suit brought by the
government as prima facie evidence in an action brought by any other party against the
same defendant. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964).
47 392 U.S. at 139.
45 Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 231 F. Supp. 72, 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) ;
Affiliated Music Enterprises v. Sesac, Inc., 17 F.R.D. 509, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) ; Trebuhs
Realty Co. v. News Syndicate Co., 107 F. Supp. 595, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
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objectives of those laws. They have determined that promotion of
these objectives is more important to the public than is the compar-
atively small injustice which results when a wrongdoer is rewarded.
The courts have supported this reasoning by finding in the lack of
statutory support for the defenses and in the rejection of several
alternate bills expressly allowing in pari delicto as a defense at the
time the antitrust laws were in the process of enactment evidence of
congressional intent that the defenses should not bar recovery.° In
sum, the broad public interest in antitrust violations, as distinguished
from purely personal or private injury, has led to the policy deter-
mination to limit common law defenses.
There is less support for the proposition that private SEC suits
play as important a role in the enforcement of the securities acts as
private suits in the antitrust area. Private rule 10b-5 suits, for example,
are based upon a court implied civil liability rather than on a specific
statutory provision." In the 1933 and 1934 Acts Congress made no
provisions to encourage private actions as attractive as is the treble
damages provision of the Clayton Act, and in fact limited recovery
to actual damages."
Nevertheless, in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 52 a private suit brought
for proxy rule violations, the Supreme Court emphasized the same
"need for enforcement" policies which play such an important role in
private antitrust actions. The Court stated:
Private enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary
supplement to Commission action. As in antitrust treble dam-
age litigation, the possibility of civil damages or injunctive
relief serves as a most effective weapon in the enforcement of
the proxy requirements. The Commission advises that it ex-
amines over 2000 proxy statements annually and each of
them must necessarily be expedited. Time does not permit an
independent examination of the facts set out in the proxy
material . . . ."
The Court concluded that
it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies
as are necessary to make effective the congressional pur-
pose."
45 21 Vand. L. Rev. 1083, 1084, n. 13 (1968).
5° "In view of the general purpose of the Act, the mere omission of an express
provision for civil liability is not sufficient to negative what the general Iaw implies."
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). See also L. Loss,
supra note 1, at 1757-97.
51
 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1964). For a recent and extensive analysis of whether more
than actual damages are recoverable under the securities acts, with a negative conclu-
sion, see Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2c1 Cir. 1969). But see deHaas
v. Empire Petroleum Co., 302 F. Supp. 647 (D. Colo. 1969).
52 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
53 Id. at 432.
Id. at 433.
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This statement reflects the Court's awareness of the public interest
in the enforcement of the securities acts. One purpose of the securities
acts is to protect individual investors.' But as Congress recognized,
the need to regulate transactions in securities goes far beyond the need
to provide protection to individual investors:
transactions in securities as commonly conducted upon secu-
rities exchanges and over-the-counter markets are affected
with a national public interest which makes it necessary to
provide for regulation and control of such transactions and
of practices and matters related thereto . . . 66
The 1934 Act, in principle an expansion of the 1933 Act, is directed
toward the protection of interstate commerce, the national credit, the
federal taxing power, the national banking system, and the Federal
Reserve System as well as to the maintenance of fair and honest
securities markets." The Act recognizes that the prices of securities
are susceptible to manipulation and control.' This in turn can give
rise to excessive speculation causing unreasonable fluctuations in the
market." Congress embodied in the Act its recognition of the impact
this process can have on the national welfare:
National emergencies, which produce widespread unem-
ployment and the dislocation of trade, transportation, and
industry, and which burden interstate commerce and ad-
versely affect the general welfare, are precipitated, inten-
sified, and prolonged by manipulation and sudden and unrea-
sonable fluctuations of security prices and by excessive
speculation . . . . 80
Thus, although there are numerous investors who directly benefit by
the congressional regulation of securities transactions, non-investors
also benefit because federal securities regulation is integrally related
to the maintenance of nationwide economic stability." And, in more
immediate ways, the securities acts guard the interests of many non-
investors. For example, many non-investors contribute money peri-
odically to insurance, pension, and retirement plans. Much of this
SS Associated Securities Corp. v. SEC, 293 F.2d 738, 740 (10th Cir. 1961) ; Dolgow
v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 482 (E.D.N.Y. 1968):
The disclosure provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 were designed to protect the small investor by preventing
those "on the 'inside'" from taking "advantage of their superior knowledge to
profit at the expense of the stockholders or of the investing public."
se 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1964).
57
 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1964). "The great exchanges of this country upon which millions
of dollars of securities are sold are affected with a public interest in the same degree as any
other great utility." H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1934).
58 15 U.S.C. § 78b(3) (1964).
59
 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1964).
60 15 U.S.C. § 78b(4) (1964).
el Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 214, 216-17 (1959).
267
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
money is then invested for the ultimate benefit of those who pay the
premiums.°2 In addition, securities are frequently used as collateral
in loan transactions where it is important to the interests of the se-
curing parties that the values of the securities are fairly and honestly
determined 83 Under these circumstances unchecked violations of the
securities acts may affect the ability of insurance companies to meet
their obligations and may threaten the soundness of the banking
system.
Attainment of the purposes of the Acts was sought by adoption
of a policy of full and fair disclosure in securities transactions.' Sec-
tion 10(b), with its corresponding rules, is an important part of that
policy designed to prevent manipulative and deceptive devices.° The
thrust of rule 10b-5 goes to the protection of such fraud as is accom-
plished by false statements, a failure to correct a misleading impres-
sion, or not stating anything at all when there is a duty to speak."
Thus, enforcement of rule 10b-5 serves "important public purposes." 87
Enforcement of the provisions of the securities acts is the responsi-
bility of the SEC. Its activities are both regulatory and disciplinary
in nature but, because of limitations of personnel and financial sup-
port, the SEC's investigatory and remedial activities are restricted:
Because of budgetary limitations, and alternative demands on
available manpower, the Commission cannot fully investi-
gate or take action in every case of possible violation as
Private rule 10b-5 suits are, therefore, an important supplement to ad-
ministrative action,°° and encouragement of such suits increases the
effectiveness of the rule.
The Kuehnert court felt that the decision in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co." already provided a substantial deterrent to insiders;
thus, it reasoned that it was now desireable to provide a similar deter-
rent to tippees. This reasoning fails to take into account one of the
most important objectives of the policy of encouraging private suits
among guilty parties by the limitation of common Iaw defenses, that
62 In 1954, the book value of private non-insured pension funds was $11 billion; 10
years later it was over $46 billion. It has been estimated that net receipts will amount to
$6 billion annually by 1970 and $8 billion by 1980. Mundheim & Henderson, Applicability
of the Federal Securities Laws to Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans, 29 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 795, 796 (1964). For a discussion of how pension funds and other institutional
investors utilize the securities markets, see SEC Report of Special Study of Securities
Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 837-70 (1963).
63 See 15 U.S.C. § 78b(3) (1964).
64 Sowards, The Federal Securities Act, 11 Business Organizations § 1.02 (1969).
65 See note 1 supra.
60 See note 1 supra.
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138 (1968).
68 Excerpt from SEC amicus curiae brief as quoted in Dolgow v. Anderson, 43
F.R.D. 472, 483 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). See also Cary, Administrative Agencies and the
Securities and Exchange Commission, 20 Law & Contemp. Prob. 653-54 (1964).
13"9 J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
70
 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969).
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is, the exposure of violators. The maintenance of the principles of full
disclosure and honest dealing in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities is too important to allow fraudulent activity to go un-
detected. Texas Gulf Sulphur was concerned with standards of conduct
but did not bear on the question of exposure. As one writer has noted:
[I] t seems contrary to common sense to believe that episodes
like those in Cady, Roberts and Texas Gulf Sulphur are as
rare as their legal outcroppings.n
The limitation of common law defenses would make rule lOb-5
more effective by increasing exposure of violations, and the greater
likelihood of exposure would act as a greater deterrent. The circum-
stances in Kuehnert demonstrate this. The court admitted that by re-
fusing the dupe-tippee a remedy against the insider, the insider has
"free rein."72 He can distribute false and misleading information to
certain investors with impunity, fearing neither possible liability to
the dupe-tippees nor exposure. Without the self-interest in the prospect
of recovering their losses, the dupe-tippees are unlikely to risk SEC
and criminal sanctions by exposing the insider who defrauded them.
Thus, such fraudulent activity will often remain undiscovered. With-
out fear of exposure by those he uses, an insider can lead others un-
sophisticated in securities dealings into fraudulent schemes intended
for manipulative purposes. Despite this, the Kuehnert court felt it
should not allow a tippee to recover because this would, in effect, give
him "an enforceable warranty" against an insider that secret infor-
mation is true. This kind of injustice should be overlooked when ex-
posure of statutory violations is so important to the public interest.
This "warranty" may make it less risky for a tippee, but an insider,
knowing the recourse the misled tippee would have against him, is
far less likely to give the tippee such an opportunity. Deterring viola-
tions of SEC regulations at their source, at the insider level, would be
far more effective. Insiders are more likely to have access to informed
counsel and to be aware of the rules prohibiting misuse of corporate
confidential information for personal gain. And, as noted in the dis-
senting opinion to Kuehnert, when violations occur, exposure through
private suits renders all guilty parties "more easily subject to appro-
priate civil, administrative, and criminal penalties." 73
With the degree of public interest involved in the enforcement of
rule 10b-5 through private suits, the Can-Am principle that in cases
under Section 12 of the 1933 Act it is necessary to differentiate the
guilt of the parties74 ought to be equally applicable in rule 10b-5 cases.
As in Moscarelli, mere participation by a plaintiff should not per se
bar his recovery. Although decisions in these and other securities acts
71 Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the
Stock Market, 53 Va. L. Rev. 1425, 1474 (1967).
72 412 P.2d at 705.
73 Id. at 706, n.3.
74 331 E.2d at 373.
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cases have been based on facts in particular cases, these principles
should be applicable in all rule lOb-5 cases. This is supported by the
growing importance of private suits under rule 10b-5." Violations of
the rule can bring liability whether or not willfully committed. The
Kuehnert decision would apparently bar recovery by any tippee,
whether he acted willfully or was merely unknowledgeable about the
rule's prohibition against the use of inside information. The court
denied recovery to Kuehnert without discussion of the willfulness of
his conduct. Aside from that consideration, Kuehnert was an unknow-
ing part of a larger scheme by Rhame to gain working control of
Texstar. Rhame's use of Kuehnert for this purpose constituted a
breach of trust to other Texstar stockholders. Nevertheless, the court
made no attempt to differentiate the degree of guilt of the parties.
Apart from the question of whether in pall delicto should bar
recovery by a true co-conspirator or a party with equal guilt," unclean
hands at least should not be a sufficient defense. It is true that the
actions of a dupe-tippee may be so predicated upon purely personal
interests and motives that allowing recovery may seem unjust. And
though one of the objectives of rule 10b-5 is to protect the ordinary
person who buys and sells securities, it is also the implicit purpose of
the rule, as evidenced by its inclusion in a legislative act specifically
adopted to protect significant national and public interests, to safe-
guard both the investing and non-investing public in many different
ways. Protection of individuals and protection of the public in general
are not mutually exclusive courses of action.
CONCLUSION
The decision in Kuehnert that the unclean hands of a dupe-tippee
should bar his recovery of losses under rule I0b-5 against the insider
who defrauded him tends to lessen, rather than enhance, the effective-
ness of that rule. It is likely that many violations of rule 10b-5 go
undiscovered. Particularly in circumstances like those in Kuehnert,
the bar of unclean hands closes the most likely avenue of exposure. A
strong deterrent to similar schemes is thereby lost.
The policy of full disclosure which rule 10b-5 is intended to
effect is an important underpinning of securities regulation. The reg-
ulation of the securities markets is vital to the maintenance of na-
tional economic stability. This, in fact, is the basis of federal legisla-
tive jurisdiction." With such a public interest in the enforcement of
rule 10b-5, judicial policy should be directed towards promoting en-
forcement. Private suits aid enforcement significantly and their role is
increasing. Keeping bars to such suits at a minimum as a matter of
policy best serves the public interest. This policy is in keeping with
the principles laid down by the Supreme Court that "broad common
law barriers to relief [are inappropriate] when a private suit serves
75
 Kuehnert v. Texstar, 412 F.2d 700, 706, n.2 (5th Cir 1969).
76 Id, at n.3.
77 15 U.S.C. 78b (1964).
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important public purposes,"" and that the courts should "be alert to
provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congres-
sional purpose."" The public interest in the exposure of rule lob-5
violations should be sufficient to overcome any judicial reluctance to
reward a wrongdoer. No rule 1.013-5 suit is only a question of "account-
ing between joint conspirators.""
JOHN M. DESTEFANO
78 Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138 (1968).
70 J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).
80 Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 703 (5th Cir. 1969). -
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